China is introducing a national carbon emission trading system (ETS), with details yet to be finalized. The ETS is expected to cover only the major emitters but it is often argued that a more comprehensive system will achieve the emission goals at lower cost. We first examine an ETS that covers both electricity and cement sectors and consider an ambitious cap starting in 2017 that will meet the official objective to reduce the carbon-GDP intensity by 60-65% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels. The two ETS-covered industries are compensated with an output-based subsidy to represent the intention to give free permits to the covered enterprises. We then consider a hybrid system where the non-ETS sectors pay a carbon tax and share in the CO2 reduction burden. Our simulations indicate that hybrid systems will achieve the same CO2 goals with lower permit prices and GDP losses. We also show how auctioning of the permits improves the efficiency of the ETS and the hybrid systems. Finally, we find that these CO2 control policies are progressive in that higher incomes households bear a bigger burden.
Mun S Ho, Dale W Jorgenson, and Wenhua Di. 2002. “Pollution taxes and public health.” In Economics of the Environment in China, edited by Jeremy J. Warford and Yi Ning Li. Bethesda, MD: Aileen International Press.
Mun S Ho, Dale W Jorgenson, and Dwight H. Perkins. 1998. “China’s economic growth and carbon emissions.” In Energizing China: Reconciling Environmental Protection and Economic Growth, edited by Michael B. McElroy, Chris P Nielsen, Peter Lydon, and eds.. Cambridge, MA: HUCE/Harvard University Press. Publisher's Version
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